The paper uses a large sample of 488 firms that experience technical default between 1983 and 1997 to examine managers' accrual strategies and their insider trading behavior in the period preceding the event of default. Our results are consistent with our conjecture that insider trading is informative about firms' expected costs of default, and with our expectation that insider trading measures are related to both pre-default earnings management and post-default stock returns. We find that managers facing higher expected costs of default make income increasing accrual choices and that managers' exercise of discretion is successful in staving-off default. We also find that although managers are ultimately unable to avoid default, by delaying both the violation and subsequent adverse stock-market response, managers benefit by selling their equitycontingent wealth at higher prices. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to show that upwardly managed accruals are successful in avoiding default, and to provide new evidence on how managers benefit from delaying default. Our results also suggest that investigating managers' trading patterns is useful in determining the likelihood of pre-default earnings management.
Introduction
This paper uses a sample of 488 firms that experience technical default between 1983 and 1997 to examine managers' accrual strategies and their insider trading behavior in the period surrounding technical default. We find that, when facing higher expected costs of default, managers make income increasing accrual choices, and their exercise of discretion is successful in staving-off default. Further, although their firms ultimately are unable to avoid default, we show that by delaying both the violation and subsequent adverse stock-market response, managers benefit by selling their equity contingent wealth at higher prices.
Our contributions stem from a research design that produces new evidence, and increases the persuasiveness of extant evidence, that managers in firms approaching debt-covenant limits have incentives to make income increasing accounting choices-a central prediction of positive accounting theory. Indeed, the evidence in recent studies investigating actual events of default is mixed (cf. Section 2); some researchers suggest managers alter earnings to delay debt covenant default [DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) ; Sweeney (1994) ], whereas others do not [Beneish and Press (1993); Healy and Palepu (1990) ; DeAngelo et al. (1994) ]. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to show that upwardly managed accruals are successful in avoiding default, and to provide evidence that managers benefit from delaying default by selling their equity-contingent wealth. We describe the basis for our assertion and how our design differs from prior research below.
Our tests examining managers' accrual strategies in the period surrounding the event of technical default follow DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) . We believe our research design and tests provide more compelling evidence than previous efforts, for six reasons:
(1) We rely on Kothari's et al. (2001) method of computing performance matched discretionary accruals. Specifically, for each technical default firm we identify a performance matched firm based on industry membership, period and lagged Return on Assets and then estimate performance matched discretionary accruals as the difference between various accrual metrics for treatment and control firms. These alternative computations are appealing as the principal criticism of accrual based earnings management studies is that aggregate accrual models fail to disentangle the effects of performance and discretion on accruals. 1 (2) Because managers' discretionary accounting choices and their trading behavior are both signals of managers' private information, investigating insider trading patterns enables us to assess whether earnings are indeed managed. Insider trading-an observable managerial action-has been shown to be informative about unobservable managers' accrual manipulations [Beneish (1999) ; Beneish and Vargus (2002) ].
(3) We believe that insider trading increases the power of our tests in another significant manner. Assuming managers trade on their private expectations of the costs of default, partitioning the sample on insider trading enables us to treat sample firms as heterogeneous with respect to managers' economic incentives to avoid default. This is consistent with evidence that managers' incentives to avoid default vary across firms [Beneish and Press (1993 , 1995a , 1995b ; Sweeney (1994) ; Dichev and Skinner (2001) ].
2 (4) We show that estimated discretionary accruals are sufficiently large to delay default in 46 of 96 firms (48 percent) where covenant limits are available. This contrasts with DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) who find that accrual discretion is insufficient to avoid default for the 22 firms for which they identify debt covenant constraints. The authors suggest their evidence (p.173) "indicates that the violating firms would find it difficult to manipulate to an extent that would avoid violation." It also contrasts with Sweeney (1994, p. 306) who, in a similar analysis, suggests that managers' accounting choices and accounting changes are not effective in delaying default.
(5) We supplement our analysis of aggregate discretionary accrual measures by examining a specific accrual (bad debt provision) and an accounting choice (depreciation method). As we discuss later, we find corroborating evidence suggestive of earnings management.
(6) Whereas sample sizes in prior work range from 76 to 130 firms experiencing actual events of default, the size of our sample (488 firms) is at least three times larger than in previous work, allowing us to employ more powerful tests.
1 DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) rely on aggregate accrual expectation models in which the ability to isolate managerial discretion is questionable. This is all the more so when the incentive context studied is correlated with performance, as is the case because actual defaults typically result from deteriorating financial performance [see McNichols and Wilson (1988) ; Holthausen et al. (1995) ; Guay et al. (1996) ; Beneish (1997 Beneish ( , 1998 McNichols (2000) ; and Kothari et al. (2001) ]. 2 We conjecture that mixed results in prior research arise from differential economic incentives to avoid default, even among firms for which the event of default is material enough to warrant disclosure. Beneish and Press (1993, 1995a) document the existence of differential costs and consequences to technical default. They observe that some instances of default are waived at no cost and have no stock market consequences, while other cases are associated with costly renegotiations, adverse stock market effects, and further, more profound financial distress. Similarly, Sweeney (1994) finds varying costs of default, as only 52 percent of her sample firms are forced to make concessions to lenders following their technical default. Dichev and Skinner (2001) find that default is a common event in their sample of private lending agreements and that the consequences of violation vary considerably depending on the borrowers' economic circumstances.
Our results are consistent with our conjecture that insider trading is informative about firms' expected costs of default, and with our expectation that insider trading measures are related to both pre-default earnings management and post-default stock returns. First, with no partition on insider trading, we observe weak evidence of income increasing, performance matched discretionary accruals in the years preceding the year of default. However, when we condition by level of insider trading, we find significant income increasing discretionary accruals, but only for those firms in which there are abnormal levels of insider selling (as defined later). Further, these income increasing accruals are temporary, as we document a significant reversal in the year of default. In sharp contrast, the various accrual metrics we test are statistically insignificant for firms in which managers are not abnormal sellers, and we find no difference between the level of accruals pre-and post-default.
Second, we find that abnormal selling firms have significantly poorer stock returns in the year following default than do firms in their sample complement. Third, because technical default in our sample is most likely caused by deteriorating financial performance, and abnormal insider selling could simply occur in anticipation of that deterioration, we compare the insider trading behavior of default firms to a sample of firms matched by industry, period, and performance (Return on Assets) in the year of default. We find that in the period prior to default, managers in abnormal insiderselling firms divest themselves of significantly more equity than their counterparts in performance matched control firms. We interpret the higher level of insider selling as reflecting managers' expectations of the costs of default. Fourth, consistent with abnormal selling firms engaging in earnings management, we find these firms are significantly more likely to adopt income increasing accounting choices (income increasing depreciation methods, lower bad debt allowances) relative to performance matched control firms.
To the extent that managers have private information about the ex post costs and consequences of default, and that they condition their trading behavior on these expectations, measuring insider trading activity enables us to partition the sample based on the strength of ex ante incentives to manage earnings. While we believe that this allows us to construct powerful tests of earnings management, we note two potential limitations to our study. One limitation is that the sample consists of firms for which technical default was material enough to warrant disclosure. This introduces selection bias because it excludes firms that were successful in avoiding violation. A second potential limitation is that our interpretation of the results assumes that performance matched accruals are reasonable surrogates for managers' exercise of discretion over accruals. Given these cautions, we interpret our evidence as suggesting that managers in firms approaching debt covenant limits have incentives to make income increasing accounting choices.
3 Indeed, although firms in our sample are unsuccessful in avoiding default, we find strong evidence of income increasing earnings management in the periods preceding the event of default. Our findings also suggest that investigating managers' trading patterns is useful for determining whether earnings have indeed been managed.
The remainder of the paper is organized in five parts. Section 2 discusses previous research, and Section 3 details the hypothesis development. Sample selection and methods are discussed in Section 4. Empirical results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
Previous Research 2.1 Accounting Choice and Technical Default
Positive theory assumes costly debt-covenant default, and predicts managers have incentives to make accounting choices to avoid default [Watts and Zimmerman (1986) firms' closeness to current ratio and tangible net-worth constraints. They find significantly greater proportions of firms slightly above covenants' violation thresholds than below, and interpret the evidence as indicating managers take actions to avoid covenant default. As the authors recognize, a limitation of their study is that while investigating discontinuities in the distribution of covenant slack may be informative about which firms are likely to have managed earnings, the method is silent about the form and extent of earnings management. Furthermore, they document that some firms engage in default repeatedly, thus, implying that the incentives to avoid default varies across firms, and may in fact be near zero for some firms.
Our study assumes that managers have private information about the ex post costs and consequences of default, and their trading behavior prior to default reflects their expectations of these costs. To the extent that the ex post costs of technical default are indicative of the strength of the ex ante incentive to manage earnings, we can assess whether insider trading distinguishes the subset of technical defaulters that managed earnings to delay the occurrence of technical default.
Insider Trading
We view managers' trading behavior as a signal of managers' private information. The evidence that insiders act as informed traders and profit from their private information is pervasive.
In U.S. stock markets, the evidence includes Lorie and Niedhoffer (1968 ), Jaffe (1974 ), Finnerty (1976 , Madden (1979 ), Penman (1982 , Nunn et al. (1983) , Elliot et al. (1984) , Seyhun (1986 , 1988 , 1992 , 1998 ), and Park et al. (1995 
Hypothesis Development
Because our sample firms ultimately are unsuccessful in avoiding technical default, we follow previous work and relate our predictions with respect to incentives for earnings management to the year preceding the year of default (year -1) and, as we discuss below, measure insider trading contemporaneously with the period in which earnings are allegedly managed.
Insider Trading, Accruals, and Earnings Management
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) report significant positive unexpected accruals in the year before default, and interpret their findings as evidence that managers increase income to avoid default. If, by manipulating accruals, managers postpone default and the associated stock price declines, they can exploit their private information and use the delay to reduce their equity holdings.
Thus, to the extent that managers increase earnings to delay costly technical default, we expect them to sell their equity-contingent wealth. This expectation is consistent with evidence from Beneish (1999) that managers in firms subject to SEC enforcement actions overstate earnings while concurrently selling their equity-contingent wealth at higher prices.
Alternatively, if income increasing earnings management is intended to mislead investors, managers could strategically restrict their selling to reduce the likelihood of attracting the attention of the SEC's insider trading monitors. This would reduce the usefulness of the insider trading signal and bias against finding a relation between the interaction of insider trading, earnings management and future performance. However, Beneish (1999) shows the SEC rarely imposes trading sanctions, even on insiders who sold stock and were charged with fraudulent earnings overstatement. Further, if income increasing earnings management were successful in delaying declines in stock prices, the increase in the time between the selling and the release of the technical default announcement would likely reduce the probability that the trades would draw further scrutiny.
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Assuming that our abnormal insider selling and non-abnormal selling groups represent a partition based on the expected costs of default-hence, on the incentive to manage earnings upward-we hypothesize that the level of accruals, unexpected accruals and performance matched discretionary accruals (which we henceforth refer to as accrual metrics) systematically differs between these two groups. In alternative form, we propose:
H1: In the period preceding default, accruals metrics are greater for firms in which there is abnormal insider selling relative to firms in which there is not abnormal selling.
Insider Trading, Performance, and Default Costs
Our second hypothesis follows from prior insider trading research, and evaluates whether abnormal selling is associated with lower post-trading returns. DeFond and Jiambalvo report evidence of "positive (income) manipulation that is particularly strong in the year prior to violation". These manipulations have two possible interpretations (1) managers are signaling positive private information about their firm's future cash flows, or (2) managers are attempting to hide a deterioration in firm performance and avoid default. To the extent that managers engage in both abnormal selling and income increasing earnings management, the earnings management and insider trading signals are inconsistent which suggests that these managers' accrual strategies are intended to hide poor firm performance. This would increase the likelihood that the accruals are misleading, and imply lower future returns. If our insider trading partition captures differences in the expected costs of default, and hence in the likelihood the earnings are managed, we hypothesize that postdefault stock returns will systematically differ between these two groups. In alternative form, our second hypothesis is:
H2: Post-default stock returns are lower for firms in which there is abnormal insider selling relative to firms in which there is not abnormal insider selling.
It is well established that insiders sell in anticipation of future firm performance. For example, prior work finds significant increases in insider selling in periods preceding bankruptcy [Eyssell (1991); Gosnell et al. (1992) ; and Seyhun and Bradley (1997) ]. However, we seek to investigate whether insider trading is informative about the expected costs of default, becausealthough accounting researchers have long held that technical default is costly-evidence of the economic costs of default is scarce. We thus attempt to disentangle whether managers' selling simply reflects an anticipated deterioration of performance, or whether it also reflects managers' expected costs of default. Because technical default is most likely caused by deteriorating financial performance [Beneish and Press (1995a) ] and abnormal insider selling could simply occur in anticipation of that deterioration we compare the insider trading behavior of default firms to a sample of firms matched by industry, time, and performance (measured by Return on Assets) in the year of default. In its alternative form, we evaluate the following hypothesis:
H3: In the pre-default period, managers of firms in technical default sell greater amounts of their equity-contingent wealth than managers of performance matched control firms.
Methods 4.1 Sample Selection
There is no systematic public record of technical defaults. However, financial statements disclose defaults because SEC Regulation S-X ( §210.4-08) requires "any breach of covenant of a[n]...indenture or agreement, which...exist [s] at the date of the most recent balance sheet being filed and which has not been subsequently cured, shall be stated in the notes to the financial statements."
There are also three accounting pronouncements that indirectly require default disclosure. Financial Accounting Standard No. 78 (1983) and Emerging Issues Task Force Release 86-30 (1986) dictate disclosure of the circumstances of a default when long-term debt is reclassified as a current liability.
SAS No. 59 mandates that lack of compliance with covenants is a basis for auditors disclosing going concern problems. Because of these rules, financial statements reflect the occurrence of material, uncured debt covenant violations.
Our sample incorporates the 87 firms in technical default studied in Beneish and Press (1995a), and we extend their sample, updating it through a search on keywords "technical default", "covenant violation", and "waiver" in financial-statement footnotes available on Compact Disclosure between 1988 and 1997. Our search of Compact Disclosure yielded 1,475 candidates. For inclusion in our sample, we require that each firm be in technical default on an accounting-based covenant.
The sample excludes firms in violation of a capital expenditure or dividend-payment constraints, mining reserve requirements, or leasehold restrictions. We further eliminated candidates for which: Tables 1 and 2 .
Using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, we compare the distribution of size, leverage, liquidity and profitability measures of default firms in year -2 to all non-violator firms available on the Compustat Primary, Supplementary, and Tertiary annual file and the Full Coverage file in the two-digit SIC industries to which violators belong. As in Beneish and Press (1993) , several statistically significant differences obtain. Firms that experience technical default are smaller, more levered, and less profitable than non-violators.
In Table 1 , we examine firms' financial characteristics in years -2 to +1 relative to the year of default. The table documents that technical defaulters experience deteriorating financial performance.
Specifically, from year -2 onwards, defaulters generally exhibit declining market value, increasing leverage, lower profitability, and lower growth. Firms' financial characteristics are similar in years -2 and -1, suggesting either that the deterioration of performance begins after year -1, or that earnings management in year -1 prevents us from detecting an earlier decline.
The behavior of various income components over time is shown in Table 2 . Our findings are similar to DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) in several respects. From years -2 to 0, we observe a decline in operating cash flows, as well as a pattern in which current accruals are markedly higher in years -2 and -1, and lower in years 0 and +1. Performance matched total accruals and unexpected current accruals display a similar pattern; they are income increasing for all models in years -2 and -1, and income decreasing in years 0 and +1.
Measuring Insider Trading
Section 16 We examine insider trading behavior in the period preceding default, and measure it contemporaneously with our various earnings management constructs. Since we propose that earnings management will occur in year -1, we compute the insider trading measure over the annual period prior to firms' release of their Forms 10-K in year -1. 5 In forming our insider trading construct, we applied procedures and assumptions similar to those used in the large body of published research on insider trading. Specifically, 1. We focus only on open market (public) transactions and omit transactions of less than 100 shares. Private transactions are omitted since it is assumed that reputation effects preclude insiders from opportunistic trading where both parties are known.
2. Prior insider trading research documents the existence of an "information hierarchy" whereby higher-level insiders possess information that is more valuable and achieve larger abnormal returns when trading [Basel and Stein (1979); Nunn et al. (1983) ; Seyhun (1986 Seyhun ( , 1998 and Lin and Howe (1990) ]. We therefore construct our measure of insider trading using the transactions of senior officers and officer directors (CEO, CFO, COO, President, and Chairman of the Board), because presumably they possess the most valuable information.
3. We construct a firm specific insider trading measure, Net Insider Trading (NIT) by summing the shares purchased less shares sold by all insiders of a given firm over the year preceding the year-1 Form10-K release:
where the sum is over each firm's i executives, and Shout is the number of shares outstanding on the date t of each transaction. NIT is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares traded by its' insiders over the given period. We normalize by shares outstanding to control for cross-sectional variation in the absolute level of shares owned by insiders. 4. We compute a normal level of insider trading for each firm to isolate abnormal insider trading from smaller liquidity trades. To do this, we use the size decile of the market value of equity of each default firm in year -2, and measure the level of insider trading for all similarly sized firms in the CRSP population. We match on firm size, following evidence in previous research that insider trading patterns vary with firm size. Small firms have relatively more insider purchases than sales, whereas larger firms have relatively more insider sales than purchases [Seyhun (1986) . This is particularly important because our sample firms tend to be smaller than non-violating firms in the same industries. For each default firm, we compute the median level of Net Insider Trading for all publicly traded firms of the same size decile measured over the identical pre-default announcement period. We then use this median level of Net Insider Trading as our benchmark of normal insider trading. Similar to Penman's (1985) approach, we categorize a firm as an abnormal selling firm if it is a net seller and if its net selling exceeds the median level of Net Insider Trading for its size-based benchmark. Using this definition, we classify 150 firms (30.7 percent) in our sample of 488 firms as abnormal sellers: Descriptive statistics on the general level of insider trading and various insider trading measures are presented in Table 3 . Abnormal selling firms average 8.5 selling transactions and only 0.5 purchases in the period prior to default. In contrast, non-abnormal sellers average only 0.4 selling transactions and 2.2 purchases. Similarly, abnormal (non-abnormal) sellers average 74,100 (1,600) shares sold, and 1,600 (18,200) shares purchased. The median abnormal selling firm's managers sell 33,300 shares, suggesting that our abnormal selling definition effectively eliminates small liquidity sales and identifies firms with larger, presumably more informative trades by insiders. In aggregate, the 11.1 million shares sold by managers in abnormal selling firms outnumber shares purchased (0.24 million) by a ratio of 46 to 1. This suggests that, as a group, senior executives of abnormal selling firms are virtually unanimous in their selling transactions.
Accrual-Expectation Models
To estimate accruals, we employ three accrual-expectation models that are variants of the Jones (1991) model. Specific details regarding the models are in the appendix. Recent work that has studied the properties of unexpected or discretionary accruals generated with models based on Jones (1991) concludes that such proxies measure earnings management with error. To mitigate this problem, we employ the methodology of Kothari et al. (2001) and compute performance matched discretionary accruals. Specifically, for each technical default firm, we identify a performance matched firm based on industry membership, period, and lagged ROA. We estimate performance matched discretionary accruals as the difference between various accrual metrics for treatment and control firms. These alternative computations are especially appealing because the central criticism leveled at accrual based earnings management studies is their failure to disentangle the effects of performance and discretion on accruals.
Results

The Behavior of Accruals around Events of Default
We present the results of our investigation of the behavior of our accrual metrics as well as their relation to insider trading in Table 4. The table contains the whole sample suggest that investigating managers' pre-default accrual strategies, using a larger sample over a longer time period than DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), yields mixed results.
We attribute the mixed results to our previous conjecture that default firms are heterogeneous with respect to managers' economic incentives to avoid default. We base this conjecture on evidence in prior work of differential economic incentives to avoid default, even among firms for which the event of default is material enough to warrant disclosure [Beneish and Press (1993 , 1995a , 1995b ; Sweeney (1994) ; and Dichev and Skinner (2001)]. For example, Dichev and Skinner (2001) propose that defaults are mainly a screening process in which some defaults are waived at virtually no cost, while more serious breeches are renegotiated and entail economic costs to the firm.
Evidence from these studies provides our motivation to partition our sample based on abnormal insider selling, under the assumption that senior managers have private information about the ex post costs and consequences of default, and their pre-default trading behavior reflects their expectations of these costs.
In Table 4 , Panel A, a re-examination the sample following our partition based on abnormal insider selling reveals the following. First, the mean and median estimated performance matched discretionary accruals for abnormal sellers are positive and significant in years -2 and -1. Mean (median) accruals are generally larger in year -1, ranging from 3.4 to 4.4 (2.4 to 4.5) percent of total assets. In contrast, the average estimated performance matched discretionary accruals for nonabnormal sellers are indistinguishable from zero. Thus, our sample partition based on abnormal selling reveals that the accruals of firms with abnormal selling drive the overall positive mean we observe for the sample as a whole. In fact, across all accrual metrics, mean and median tests find that the accruals of abnormal selling default firms are significantly greater than those of nonabnormal selling default firms.
Second, we observe that abnormal selling firms' accruals decline significantly from Year -1 to Year 0, while we document no significant change for non-insider selling firms. We interpret this result as further support of the proposition that insider trading is useful in identifying differing accrual strategies among default firms. For abnormal selling firms, the pattern of negative performance matched discretionary accruals in the period following default contrasts sharply with the positive results of the pre-default period as shown in Figures 1 and 2 . We interpret the series of pre-default positive accruals and the subsequent reversals as corroborating evidence of pre-default earnings management for the abnormal selling sample of default firms. The pattern is consistent with the concept of accrual bankruptcy [Guay et al. (1996) ], and with evidence in Beneish (1997) that a variable indicating consecutive positive accruals has the ability to predict earnings manipulation.
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The results reported in Panel B-examining performance matched total discretionary accruals-and in Panel C-examining raw current accruals and unexpected accruals-are similar.
We find evidence consistent with our first hypothesis of increasing earnings management in years immediately preceding default by abnormal selling firms. We also document that, in all cases, accrual metrics for the abnormal insider selling firms decrease significantly from Year -1 to Year 0.
In contrast, we find no significant change in discretionary or unexpected accruals for non-abnormal selling firms; the only significant decrease occurs with the unmanaged (raw) current accruals.
Overall, these results are consistent with defaults by non-abnormal selling firms having minimum economic consequences, as we find no evidence of managed earnings to avoid default, nor do we find evidence of any significant changes in discretionary accruals surrounding default. 10 The intuition is that abnormal sellers make income increasing accrual choices prior to default either to avoid reversals, or because they have exhausted alternatives to better represent their firms' performance.
The results of Table 4 imply that our insider trading partition captures different accrual strategies across the sample firms-a result consistent with the notion that incentives for income increasing earnings management prior to technical default are not homogeneous across firms. In sum, we find strong support for the hypothesis that an insider trading partition isolates a subset of firms with significant income increasing accruals. If our accrual metrics measure earnings management, our evidence suggests income increasing earnings management to avoid default is more likely in firms in which managers engage in abnormal insider selling.
Insider Trading and Stock Returns Surrounding Default
In Table 5 , we examine the stock-market performance of firms in the two sub-samples based on abnormal insider selling. Panels A and B report the results for raw returns and market-adjusted returns for two periods: (1) the period from 10-K Year -1 to the announcement of technical default (10-K Year 0 ), and (2) the 250 trading-day period following the default announcement.
We find the return performance of abnormal-selling firms is much poorer than that of nonabnormal selling firms. In Panel A, the mean (median) return over the period from the release of the Year -1 Form 10-K to the technical default announcement of -17.0 (-24.8) percent for abnormal insider-selling firms is significantly lower than the corresponding -4.9 (-15.0) percent return observed for the sample complement (p-value = 0.01). Similarly, the mean (median) raw return over the 250 trading-day period following the technical default announcement, equals 1.2 (-16.2) percent for abnormal insider-selling firms and is significantly lower than the corresponding 11.7 (0.0) percent return observed for the sample complement. Insofar as these returns are suggestive of the market's assessment of the magnitude of the costs of default, the expected default costs are significantly higher for those firms in which we observe abnormal insider selling.
These findings are consistent with the notion that managers engage in abnormally high levels of insider selling in anticipation of greater costs of default and more adverse stock price effects [Beneish and Press (1993, 1995b) ]. Further, the results are consistent with managers of nonabnormal selling firms expecting a less costly event of default and may explain why we fail to detect evidence of earnings management prior to default or any significant changes in accruals surrounding default for these firms. We draw similar inferences when market-adjusted returns are used to measure stock performance. We interpret the stock return evidence as consistent with our second hypothesis: stock market performance is significantly lower for the subset of default firms in which managers engage in abnormal insider selling.
However, we recognize that the price declines for our default firms could arise from poor financial performance and/or large expected default costs. To investigate the proposition that insider trading is related to default costs, we evaluate our third hypothesis by comparing the insider trading behavior of default firms to a sample of firms matched by industry, time, and performance in the year of default. We report these results in Table 6 . Panel A reveals that the mean and median levels of insider trading for our entire default sample are not significantly different from that of non-default firms matched on year, industry, and ROA. In Panel B, we examine the level of trading for abnormal insider-selling default firms for which (as previously defined) "abnormal selling" firms display net insider selling in excess of the median selling for firms of similar size. We observe mean (median) insider selling in abnormal selling firms of 0.73 (0.29) percent of their firms' shares outstanding, which is significantly greater than the mean (median) insider selling by performance matched control firms of 0.35 (0.01) percent. We interpret the higher level of selling by managers in abnormal selling default firms as suggesting that these managers' trading behavior is not only influenced by deteriorating firm performance but also their expectation of economically significant default costs.
In Panel C, we find insiders of non-abnormal selling default firms are net buyers rather than sellers of their firms' stock in the period preceding default. This result is surprising as open market purchases by senior executives are often interpreted as a strong signal of increasing firm performance. 11 A possible interpretation of this evidence is that managers of such firms expect lower costs of default and are seeking to signal to lenders and other investors their confidence in their firm's future prospects. Overall, these findings support our third hypothesis that managers condition their trading on their expectations of default costs.
Additional Evidence 5.3.1 Specific Accounting and Accrual Choices
Our evidence on aggregate accruals suggests that executives of abnormal insider-selling firms manage earnings upward to delay default and postpone stock price declines. Given criticisms of aggregate accrual models, we seek confirming evidence by examining the behavior of a specific accrual, the provision for bad debts, that has previously been studied (e.g., McNichols and Wilson (1988) , Teoh at al. (1998) ) and an accounting choice, the depreciation method selected.
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Our tests investigate whether depreciation methods and the provision for bad debts in technical default firms are more income increasing than in firms matched on industry and performance.
In Table 7 , we observe that abnormal insider-selling default firms are significantly more likely to have adopted income increasing depreciation methods than control firms. Where default and control firms have differing methods, default firms are almost three times as likely to have adopted more income increasing methods than their control (24.4 percent versus 8.9 percent). In contrast, we find no significant difference for non-abnormal selling default firms. Relative to their control firms, non-abnormal selling firms use more income increasing methods 14.8 percent of the 11 Open market purchases by senior insiders are infrequent and viewed as a strong signal of future performance given that senior executives: (1) acquire most of their equity through performance and stock option plans, and (2) presumably hold under-diversified investment portfolios since a large part of their wealth (stock, options, salary, bonus, pension) is tied to firm performance. Improving firm performance is consistent with executives seeking out additional equity-based investments and exacerbating the diversification problem. 12 While prior work on debt covenants and accounting choices [Beneish and Press (1993) , Sweeney (1994) ] also examines choices relating to inventory valuation, investment tax credits, and pension amortization periods, we focus on depreciation method choice because it is not clear which inventory valuation method is income increasing v. decreasing, investment tax credits were phased out in the mid-1980s, and accounting for pensions has changed over the sample time period.
time, however, they use less income increasing methods 11.6 percent of the time.
In Table 8 , we find that the provision for bad debts of abnormal-selling firms (4.1 percent of accounts receivable) is significantly lower than their control firms (7.0 percent of accounts receivable). We observe no significant difference for non-abnormal selling firms. The results of both of these additional analyses are consistent with the proposition that abnormal selling firms engage in earnings management prior to default. Furthermore, the evidence is also consistent with our accrual related findings that non-abnormal selling firms do not engage in earnings management to avoid default.
Debt-Covenant Slack, Accruals, and Default Avoidance in Year -1
Because our evidence suggests that managers' make income increasing accrual choices to avoid default, we next investigate whether the estimated discretionary accruals are indeed successful in staving off default. Our tests of the relations among debt-covenant slack, accrual levels and default avoidance, focus on 96 (of 488) firms for which we can identify at least one constraint.
We study the lending agreements that are subsequently violated, as well as firms' financial statement disclosures, to evaluate the covenants governing working capital, leverage, net worth, and retained earnings, according to procedures described in Beneish and Press (1993, 1995a) . To assess slack-following Beneish and Press (1995b)-we compute the difference between the contractually required minimum (or maximum) level and the reported financial statement levels at the end of Year -1 on each constrained dimension.
After determining slack on the most restrictive of the covenants for each firm, we standardize the computation by total assets at the beginning of Year -1 (because lagged total assets deflate the accrual measures). For example, for a covenant on tangible net worth, we evaluate slack as:
We then compare the accruals in Year -1 to the standardized slack associated with the most restrictive covenant, using either performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and raw current accruals. Thus, we evaluate whether firms were successful or unsuccessful in staving-off default depending on whether the estimated discretionary accruals are greater or lower than the standardized slack associated with the most restrictive covenant.
Given the properties of accounting-based, debt-covenant constraints, only income increasing accruals reduce the likelihood of covenant violation in a given period [Press and Weintrop (1990) ;
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)]. Using performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, and raw current accruals as the measure of managerial discretion, we observe 67 of the 96 technical default firms with at least one income increasing accrual metric. For the 67 firms with slack data and positive performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, we find that 46 firms delay default for one year. That is, 46 firms exhibit accruals of sufficient magnitude to have prevented technical default. Using raw current accruals as the measure of managerial discretion, 41 firms avoid default.
Our result that between 43 and 48 percent of the firms with available covenant data delay default for one year is a significant finding relative to prior work. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) do not document any actual cases of default avoidance, despite observing income increasing accruals in the year prior to default. Sweeney (1994) reports that for 22 of 130 default firms for which she obtained covenant data, only five were able to delay default for a quarter or two. We show that accrual magnitudes in the year preceding default are large enough to forestall default, and this occurs more frequently than has previously been reported. Assuming performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, and raw current accruals, capture earnings management, our evidence suggests that managers of firms facing technical default use accruals opportunistically to delay the onset of default.
Summary and Conclusions
The paper examines whether an observable action, managers' insider trading, is useful in determining the existence of earnings management in anticipation of a costly technical default. Our evidence is consistent with the proposition that managers have private information about the ex post costs and consequences of default, and that they condition their trading behavior on these expectations. Assuming that performance matched accruals are reasonable surrogates for managers' exercise of discretion over accruals, we find that abnormal selling firms exhibit pre-default earnings management, the firm's insiders sell significantly more stock than similar poorly performing firms and the firm experiences significant adverse post-default stock returns. In contrast, non-abnormal selling firms show no evidence of earnings management, insiders are net acquirers of their firms' stock, and the firm experiences significantly smaller stock price effects following default. We believe these results support our proposition that measuring insider trading activity enables us to partition technical default firms based on the strength of ex ante incentives to manage earnings, allowing us to construct more powerful tests of earnings management.
Our interpretation of the findings assumes that debt covenants provide incentive to manage earnings upwards. Our evidence shows that, although the firms ultimately cannot avoid default, by delaying the violation and subsequent adverse stock-market response, managers benefit by selling their equity-contingent wealth at higher prices. Our findings are consistent with the notion that incentives to avoid debt-covenant violation are not homogenous across firms and that the signal contained in managers' trading behavior is useful in determining whether earnings have been managed. accruals of changes in the firm's economic environment, Beneish (1998) proposes an alternative modification based on cash sales (equation 4). His evidence indicates that change in cash sales preserves the intent of using cash sales, and has the advantage of using an accounting construct as an explanatory variable, to reduce the endogeneity problem.
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We estimate the models above in cross-section, using all firms in a given two-digit industry and year. Cross-sectional estimation has the advantage of not restricting the analysis only to firms with long time series of data. Each yearly estimation is used to make one-year ahead forecasts of expected accruals which, subtracted from the dependent variable, yield unexpected accruals.
13 To elaborate, it is much harder to exercise discretion over cash sales than over credit sales. Indeed, examining firms in which financial reporting behavior is deviant enough to warrant SEC enforcement actions, Beneish (1997) finds that cash sales are rarely manipulated. He reports that one firm out of 64 (1.6%) engages in circular transfers of money to create the impression of receivable collection. In contrast, 43 of 64 firms (67.2%) engage in manipulations affecting credit sales (e.g., fictitious invoices; front loading with a right of return; keeping books open past the end of the fiscal period; and overstating the percentage of completion). Operating Cash Flow = Income before Extraordinary Items (#18) -Total Accruals. Total Accruals are calculated as the change in current assets (COMPUSTAT item #4), minus the change in cash (#1), minus changes in current liabilities (#5), plus the change in short term debt (#34) -depreciation and amortization expense (#14) -deferred tax on earnings (#50) + equity in earnings (#55). If either deferred taxes or income from equity investments is missing in the COMPUSTAT files, then that item is set equal to zero in calculating total accruals. If any of the other required items is reported as missing in COMPUSTAT, that observation is dropped. Unexpected total accruals are estimated from three expectations models: (1) Jones' (1991) Model : The model relates total accruals (TACC) to the change in sales (∆Sales) and the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE #8):
TACC it = α 1i + β 1i ∆Sales it + γ 1i PPE it + ε 1it . (2) DSS modification: Jones' (1991) model as modified by (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995, [DSS] ) relates total accruals (TACC) to the change in sales less changes in receivables (#2) (∆Sales-(∆Receivables) and the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE #8):
TACC it = α 1i + β 1i (∆Sales it -∆Receivables )+ γ 1i PPE it + ε 1it (3) Beneish modification: Jones' (1991) model as modified by (Beneish 1998) relates total accruals (TACC) to the change in cash sales (∆ Cash Sales) and the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE #8) TACC it = α 1i + β 1i ∆ Cash Sales it + γ 1i PPE it + ε 1it Unexpected current accruals are estimated from similar expectations models. That is, the dependent variable is current accruals (CACC), which equals TACC plus Depreciation. The models have just one independent variable because the PPE variable is dropped. Performance matched accruals are computed as the difference between the unexpected accruals of the default firm and the unexpected accruals of a control firm matched on industry, year, and ROA (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2001 ) . -34 - (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995, DSS) relates total accruals (TACC) to the change in sales less changes in receivables (#2) (∆Sales-(∆Receivables) and the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE #8): TACC it = α 1i + β 1i (∆Sales it -∆Receivables )+ γ 1i PPE it + ε 1it (3) Beneish modification: Jones' (1991) model as modified by (Beneish 1998) relates total accruals (TACC) to the change in cash sales (∆ Cash Sales) and the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE #8) TACC it = α 1i + β 1i ∆ Cash Sales it + γ 1i PPE it + ε 1it Unexpected current accruals are estimated from similar expectations models. That is, the dependent variable is current accruals, which equals TACC plus Depreciation. The models have just one independent variable, because the PPE variable is dropped.
(a) -Insider trading is measured over the 365 days prior to the sample firm's Year -1 10-K filing date. Abnormal selling firms are those in which insiders are net sellers and in which the net insider selling exceeds the median level of net insider trading of firms in the same size (market value) decile measured over the same 365 day interval as the sample firm. Otherwise, the firm is categorized as a Non-abnormal-seller. (b) -Difference between abnormal selling and non-selling groups. Evaluated using t-test (mean) and non-parametric Wilcoxon test (median). All Hypothesis tests are twotailed except for the sample population ("all firms") and abnormal selling firms at T = -1,-2, for which the direction is hypothesized to be positive. Abnormal selling firms are those in which insiders are net sellers and in which the net insider selling exceeds the median level of net insider trading of firms in the same size decile measured over the same 365 day interval as the sample firm. Otherwise, the firm is categorized as a Non-abnormal seller. Number of observations = 382 Abnormal selling firms are those in which insiders are net sellers and in which the net insider selling exceeds the median level of net insider trading of firms in the same size decile measured over the same 365 day interval as the sample firm. Otherwise, the firm is categorized as a Non-abnormal-seller. Abnormal selling firms are those in which insiders are net sellers and in which the net insider selling exceeds the median level of net insider trading of firms in the same size decile measured over the same 365 day interval as the sample firm. Otherwise, the firm is categorized as a Non-abnormal-seller. Number of observations = 206.
